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Introduction
Early in Venus and Adonis (1593), the eponymous Goddess begins wooing the 
reluctant Adonis by asking him to alight from his horse. ‘If thou wilt deign 
this favour’, she promises, ‘for thy meed / A thousand honey secrets shalt thou 
know’ (15–16). Venus’s description of the delights she offers as ‘honey secrets’, 
and her punning on ‘meed’ as reward and mead (an alcoholic drink made with 
fermented honey), associates erotic gratification both with the epistemological 
satisfaction of knowing ‘secrets’ and with the gustatory pleasures of sweetness. 
Later in the poem, Adonis adapts Venus’s vocabulary of tasting and knowing 
to emphasize her precipitousness. ‘Before I know myself ’, he pleads, ‘seek not 
to know me’, for ‘the mellow plum doth fall, the green sticks fast, / Or being 
early plucked is sour to taste’ (525–8). Figuring his anticipated growth into 
sexual maturity as a form of ripening (premature ‘plucking’ will be sour), 
Adonis entreats Venus to refrain from attempting to ‘know’ him sexually 
before he ‘knows’ himself in the fuller moral and spiritual sense demanded 
by the nosce te ipsum maxim (a keystone of Renaissance ethics). Adonis’s plea, 
however, collapses what its speaker strives to hold apart: although Adonis 
overtly distinguishes between sexual knowledge and self-knowledge, his pun 
on ‘know’ conflates them.1 In Venus and Adonis, ‘honey secrets’ are illicit and 
transgressive, but they may also hold out the promise of self-understanding 
and moral transformation.
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Venus’s use of the language of taste to associate sensual pleasure with 
clandestine knowledge is typical of a poem that repeatedly links sweetness, 
sex, and secrets – but it is also characteristic of Shakespeare’s oeuvre, and 
Renaissance culture more broadly. Shakespeare’s works are dense with the 
language of taste: the word and its cognates appear  111 times across his 
corpus, and related vocabulary is also frequent. Perhaps most strikingly, 
‘sweet’ appears  873 times, and its variants and compound words are also 
numerous.2 Often, too, such language is associated both with sensual desire 
and with knowledge and understanding – sometimes simultaneously. In the 
Renaissance, the verb ‘taste’ could be used in a sense that is now obsolete, 
to mean ‘have carnal knowledge of ’.3 Thus, in Cymbeline (1611;  1623), 
Posthumus challenges Iachimo to test Imogen’s fidelity by daring him to 
‘make’t apparent / That you have tasted her in bed’ (2.4.55–6). As we shall 
see, this notional and lexical association between taste and sex derives, in 
part, from the low status of both, their joint status as disreputable appetitive 
desires. As the common euphemism for intercourse – carnal knowledge – 
implies, however, taste and sex are also allied insofar as they are both ways 
of knowing.
An omnipresent association between the sense of taste (especially 
sweetness) and sexual pleasure is also ubiquitous in the Renaissance more 
generally: plays, prose fiction, and poetry alike linger lasciviously on the 
beloved’s cherry lips and syrupy kisses. Conversely, experiences of sexual 
frustration, jealousy, rejection, and betrayal are commonly described as 
bitter. Such language is so common it can come to seem meaningless or 
bland. It is certainly deeply conventional, with precedents in the classical and 
scriptural traditions.4 Towards the end of Shakespeare’s Love’s Labour’s Lost 
(c.  1594–5; 1598), however, we find a moment that reminds us that ‘sweet’ 
not only serves as a generic word for that which is pleasant or attractive, but 
also designates a distinctive flavour. In response to Berowne’s plea for ‘one 
sweet word with thee’, the masked Princess (whom Berowne believes to be 
his adored Rosalind) replies ‘Honey, and milk, and sugar: there is three’ 
(5.2.230–1). ‘Sweet’, grown insipid through reiteration, is restored to gustatory 
immediacy by the Princess’s witty literalism.
Indeed, the sugary lexicon of Renaissance love poets and playwrights can 
be read as the textual residue of real sense experience. Renaissance women 
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were both industrious producers and avid consumers of sweetness, serving 
as domestic manufacturers of marchpane, suckets, and other sweetmeats  – 
including ‘kissing comfits’ which served not only to counter bad breath 
but also to flavour the mouth. John Murrell’s A daily exercise for ladies and 
gentlewomen (1617), for example, contains a recipe ‘to make Muscadinaes, 
commonly called kissing-Comfits’, by beating ‘halfe a pound of double refined 
Sugar’ with musk, ambergris, and iris-root powder to form a paste, which would 
then be rolled out and cut into ‘little Lozenges’.5 The salacious associations of 
these kinds of sweets are evident in The Merry Wives of Windsor (1602), when 
Falstaff imagines a thunderstorm of aphrodisiacs, including ‘hail’ of ‘kissing-
comfits’ (5.5.20). Perhaps, then, the lips of Adonis’s and the Princess’s real-life 
counterparts really did taste sugary.
Wendy Wall has observed that uses of the language of sweetness in early 
modern depictions of sensual pleasure are paralleled in ‘condemnations of 
fiction’ by ‘Puritan thinkers’, which similarly employ a saccharine vocabulary.6 
Wall explains this correlation by suggesting that anti-theatricalists adopted 
such language because of the prior associations of sweetness with degenerate 
erotic pleasure. ‘Historically’, she comments, ‘sweetness had been linked to an 
ethically troubling sensuality’, and plays were considered ‘syrupy’, because, like 
sex, ‘they had the capacity to act on the body and to discourage the use of 
reason by drawing the mind from virtue’.7 Wall’s discussion of the symbolic 
complexity of syrups in the period is rich and revealing, but her analysis of 
the moral valence of sweetness is somewhat one-sided, for it was not only 
anti-theatricalists who employed syrupy analogies to describe the experience 
and effects of attending plays or reading poetry. Drawing on the Horatian 
injunction that poets should combine the utile (useful or profitable) with 
the dulce (sweet or pleasurable), humanist poetics associated sweetness with 
readerly discrimination, pleasure, and erudition.8 As such, defenders of the 
poetic arts also used images of sweetness for opposing ends, attributing their 
adversaries’ distaste for poesy to their pathologically imbalanced humours. In 
his Defense of Poesy, for example, Sir Philip Sidney claims of those who dislike 
philosophical poetry that ‘the fault is in their judgement quite out of taste, 
and not in the sweet food of sweetly uttered knowledge’.9 For aficionados of 
poesie, sweetness stands not for mindless sensuality but for considered literary 
discrimination.
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In this chapter, I want to invert and expand on Wall’s suggestion that uses 
of the language of sweetness to describe audiences’ responses to theatre figure 
those responses as akin to sexual desire – that is, as irrational and corrupt. 
Instead, I suggest, in some contexts uses of the language of sweetness to 
describe sensual pleasure intimates that desire is a form of judgement. 
Attending to the language of taste reveals that, for Shakespeare and for many of 
his contemporaries, erotic gratification is a matter not only of sordid, sensual 
self-indulgence but rather incorporates a crucial (and potentially morally 
redemptive) discriminative, cognitive, and creative aspect.
When, for example, Francis Meres asserts that ‘the witty soul of Ovid lives 
in mellifluous & honey-tongued Shakespeare’, offering as evidence ‘his Venus 
and Adonis, his Lucrece, his sugared sonnets among his private friends’, 
he does more than simply pay the author a compliment on the musicality 
of his verse.10 Specifically, Meres associates Shakespeare’s poetic virtuosity 
with the eroticized sweetness of a beloved’s honeyed kisses, as both Meres’s 
comparison with the notoriously amorous Ovid and his subsequent specifying 
of Shakespeare’s most notoriously licentious works makes clear.11 As well as 
blending sweet sounds and sweet tastes in his pun on ‘mellifluous’ (from the 
Latin mel, honey), that is, Meres also affiliates sensual and literary sweetness, 
implicitly invoking a causal relationship between sexual experience and 
poetic skill. In so doing, he draws on and reduplicates an association that 
Shakespeare himself had drawn, in his drama and poetry, between sweetness, 
sensual desire, and forms of knowledge and understanding, including 
intersubjective judgement and self-knowledge, as well as rhetorical expertise.12 
As Berowne argues in Love’s Labour’s Lost, Navarre’s Neoplatonic conviction 
that the intertwined sensory pleasures of feasting and female company are a 
menace to scholarship is misplaced: ‘love, first learned in a lady’s eyes […] 
gives to every power a double power, / Above their functions and their offices’ 
(4.3.301–6). Most pertinently here, ‘Love’s tongue proves dainty Bacchus 
gross in taste’ (4.3.313); the lover is a kind of sensory superman, able to taste 
with an acuity that outdoes even Bacchus. Subsequently, ‘when Love speaks, 
the voice of all the gods / Make heaven drowsy with the harmony’ (4.3.318–
19). For Berowne, then, a side effect of love’s heightening and honing of the 
senses is the enhancement of oratical skill – in experiencing more intensely, 
the lover is also inspired to speak more compellingly. Before I expand on the 
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suggestion that the erotic pleasures of taste are associated, in Shakespeare’s 
works, with knowledge, understanding, and with literary skill, however, it is 
worth considering attitudes to and ideas about taste in Renaissance culture 
more broadly.
The ambivalence of taste
In Renaissance England, the sense of taste was radically ambivalent. On the 
one hand, following Adam and Eve’s disobedient tasting of the forbidden fruit 
and the subsequent Fall described in Genesis, it was linked to base, sinful, 
intemperate appetites. As the poet and moralist Richard Brathwaite laments in 
his essay ‘Of Tasting’ (1620):
This Sence makes mee weeppe ere I speake of her; sith hence came our greefe, 
hence our miserie: when I represent her before my eyes, my eyes become 
blinded with weeping, remembring my grandame Eve, how soone she was 
induced to taste that shee ought not […] this one Sence […] corrupted my 
pristine innocencie.13
Here, taste – personified and feminized as ‘her’, and associated with ‘my 
granddame Eve’ – is blamed for the corruption of humankind’s ‘pristine 
innocencie’: it is the ultimate source of all sin and misery. These negative 
scriptural associations were reinforced by the classical tradition, notably the 
works of Plato, which preserved a hierarchy of the senses that privileged the 
distal senses of vision and hearing, which work remotely from their objects, 
from the proximity senses of taste and touch, which depend on direct contact 
with their objects.14 In this model, taste is associated with boorish physical 
gratification, as opposed to the supposedly purer, more spiritual forms of 
pleasure and understanding offered by sight and hearing. The sensuous 
pleasures of taste are imagined to distract from the reasonable pursuit of 
virtue: as the neo-Stoic writer Lodowick Bryskett puts it in A discourse of civill 
life (1606), taste and touch are the ‘two senses that make us most like unto 
brute beasts, if we suffer our selves to be led by them, following our delights 
as they do: for they corrupt mans prudence, put his mind astray, & take away 
from him the light of reason’.15
Shakespeare / Sense90
In both Venus and Adonis and The Rape of Lucrece (1594), the animalistic, 
irrational, rapacious nature of taste is established in images of hawking 
and hunting. Venus’s enthusiastic embrace is both aggressive and quasi-
cannibalistic: she is ‘an empty eagle, sharp by fast’, who ‘tires with her beak on 
feathers, flesh and bone, / Shaking her wings, devouring all in haste, / Till either 
gorge be stuffed or prey be gone’ (55–8). The pleasure taken in eating, such 
images remind us, is predicated on the consumption, hence the obliteration, 
of its object.16 Similarly, sexual desire can also be violent, immoderate, and 
ultimately self-destructive, as well as damaging to its object: overindulgence 
can lead to surfeit and revulsion.17 ‘Lust’, as Adonis notes, ‘like a glutton dies’ 
(803). Similarly, in the Rape of Lucrece, Tarquin is described, following his 
ravishment of Lucrece, as like ‘the full-fed hound or gorged hawk’ which 
‘balk[s]’ at its usual ‘prey’:
So surfeit-taking Tarquin fares this night
His taste delicious, in digestion souring,
Devours his will that lived by foul devouring.
(694–700)
The pun on ‘fares’ as both ‘feeds, eats’ and as ‘gets on, behaves’ underscores the 
connection between eating and sexual conduct. Sensual satiation slides into 
surfeit, as the ‘delicious’ but ephemeral ‘taste’ of sensual pleasure turns sour in 
the stomach and the ‘will’ to devour Lucrece’s body consumes or ‘devours’ itself. 
Later, Lucrece rails against ‘Opportunity’, lamenting that ‘thy sugared tongue’ 
turns ‘to bitter wormwood taste’ (894), and determining that her husband 
Collatine ‘shalt not know / The stained taste of violated troth’ (1058–9) – that 
is, that he will not ‘know’ her sexually again. Here, the pleasures of taste are 
clearly associated with a vicious form of appetite which is simultaneously 
corrupted and corrupting.
This is not, however, the whole story: the sense of taste also had a range of 
much more positive associations in Renaissance culture.18 For a start, following 
Aristotle, a number of writers and thinkers emphasized the indispensability 
of taste, highlighting its crucial role in motivating us to eat, and hence in 
sustaining the body. As the anatomist Helkiah Crooke writes, along with 
touch, taste is ‘absolutely and simply necessary to our life’.19 Others elaborated 
on the social importance of eating together as a way of cementing the bonds 
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of friendship. Indeed, the imagery of uncontrolled and animalistic appetites 
in Venus and Adonis and The Rape of Lucrece is effective partly because it is 
predicated on the violation of more positive, celebratory norms and attitudes. 
Venus, for instance, attempts to frame her desire as a natural and legitimate 
form of hunger, contrasting her appetite for Adonis with what she portrays 
as his solipsistic self-worship. Just as ‘torches are made to light’, Venus claims, 
so too are ‘dainties [made] to taste’ (163–4). The body that is sustained by 
the earth has a duty to replenish it with new inhabitants: ‘Upon the earth’s 
increase why shouldst thou feed, / Unless the earth with thy increase be 
fed?’ (169–70). Venus implies that procreative sex is a necessity, not a sinful 
luxury, and – however perverse her lust – the association between taste and 
generous reciprocity that she exploits has an undeniable appeal. Similarly, it is 
worth noting that, as Lucrece’s guest, Tarquin has already indulged in a literal, 
legitimate, convivial supper provided by her household. Shakespeare’s use 
of the language of eating and tasting to describe Tarquin’s rape of Lucrece is 
shocking and effective partly because it is a reversal of the positive role that the 
pleasures of taste play in establishing and sustaining social bonds: it reminds 
us that Tarquin transgresses the rules of hospitality as well as those regulating 
sexual interaction.
As I hinted in the introduction to this essay, moreover, taste was also valued 
as an analogy for, or even as a form of, discrimination and knowledge about 
the external, material, and social world. Most obviously, in the Renaissance 
as today, the language of taste was used figuratively to indicate aesthetic 
and literary discrimination. As Allison Deutermann observes, quoting as 
evidence Hamlet’s request to the players to ‘give us a taste of your quality’, 
although ‘the concept of “taste” as aesthetic discernment has been assumed 
to be anachronistic to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England […] this 
abstracted sense of taste was already forming at the start of the seventeenth 
century’.20 Similarly, Lucy Munro notes that ‘[m]any Jacobean and, especially, 
Caroline playwrights employed a discourse of taste in order to shape spectators’ 
responses, drawing on an emergent model of aesthetic taste that is more often 
seen as characteristic of eighteenth-century culture’.21
At the point at which Shakespeare wrote, the ‘abstracted’, ‘aesthetic’ sense of 
taste as literary discrimination was well established enough to be a subject of 
parody – but not so well established that it had lost its connection to literal acts 
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of eating and drinking. Notably, it is this form of judgement that Nathanial 
claims in Love’s Labour’s Lost, when he proclaims himself a man ‘of taste’. 
Nathanial compares himself and Holofernes to the aptly named Constable 
Dull. ‘Sir’, he says to Holofernes:
[Dull] hath never fed of the dainties that are bred in a book.
He hath not eat paper, as it were; he hath not drunk ink. His intellect is not 
replenished. He is only an animal, only sensible in the duller parts.
And such barren plants are set before us, that we thankful should be –
Which we of taste and feeling are – for those parts that doe fructify in us 
more than he.
(4.2.24–9)
Nathanial’s posturing is clearly supposed to be funny, and we are laughing 
at, not with, him: because the audience is already well acquainted with his 
pedantry and self-importance, his words are bathetic. In calling himself a man 
of ‘taste and feeling’, Nathanial inadvertently reveals his own immersion in 
the lower senses he claims to disdain – an implication reinforced by the way 
he highlights the physical underpinnings of the taste metaphor, claiming (in 
contradistinction to Dull) to have ‘eat paper’ and ‘drunk ink’. Nonetheless, 
Nathanial’s words also attest to a wider cultural sense that ‘taste’ is a marker of 
literary erudition and judgement, and as such a marker of the social distinction 
he aspires to.22
The sense of taste, however, was not only associated with aesthetic and 
literary judgement in Renaissance England: it also had a much wider set of 
associations with different forms and modes of knowing. A brief consultation of 
the OED elucidates some of the epistemological range of the word ‘taste’ in this 
period.23 Firstly, taste could indicate ‘mental perception of quality; judgement, 
discriminative faculty’ more broadly, in a variety of different realms, not 
limited to the aesthetic and literary. Other definitions of the noun ‘taste’ link 
gustation to the kinds of experiential and experimental knowledge that were in 
the period increasingly central both to religious life, and in the proto-scientific 
realms of medicine and natural philosophy: in the Renaissance, a ‘taste’ could 
indicate ‘a trying, testing; a trial, a test, an examination’. Edmund uses the word 
in this way in King Lear (c. 1606): ‘I hope, for my brother’s justification, he 
wrote this but as an essay, or taste of my virtue’ (1.2.44–5). To taste can also 
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mean ‘to have experience or knowledge of ’ more broadly, as when, in Pericles 
(c.  1607), Cleon implores: ‘O, let those cities that of plenty’s cup / And her 
prosperities so largely taste […] heed these tears!’ (1.4.52–4). Here, ‘taste’ is 
a synonym for first-hand experience. Relatedly, ‘a taste’ can indicate – as it 
does today – a small sample or slight experience of something. Touchstone, for 
instance, uses the word in this way in As You Like It (c. 1599), when he offers 
Rosalind ‘a taste’ of his ability to compose bad love poetry (3.2.97).
Taste also had epistemic value in a religious context – a value which provided 
a counterbalance to its negative associations with the Fall. Psalm 34.8, ‘O taste 
and see that the lord is good’ (KJV), frames taste as an intense, experiential, 
affectively charged means of knowing the divine characterized by sweetness 
(the Latin word usually translated as ‘good’, suavis, translates more literally as 
sweet). Reformed theologians and writers across the confessional spectrum 
cited it frequently, often associating it with the potentially redemptive tasting of 
the Eucharistic elements of bread and wine.24 It is this tradition, associating the 
pleasures of taste with spiritual illumination, that informs Oliver’s response, 
near the end of As You Like It, to Celia’s question about his fraught relationship 
to his brother Orlando: ‘was’t you that did so oft contrive to kill him?’ Oliver’s 
answer is both candid and gnomic:
’Twas I, but ’tis not I. I do not shame
To tell you what I was, since my conversion
So sweetly tastes, being the thing I am.
(4.3.134–6)
The context here is not explicitly religious: Oliver’s change in attitude is 
primarily a secular one, based on his gratitude to Orlando, who has recently 
rescued him from the attack of a lioness. In linking the language of conversion 
and sweetness, however, Shakespeare also implies a more wholesale spiritual 
transformation – one which makes him worthy of Celia’s love.
In the Renaissance, then, attitudes to taste were deeply conflicted. On the 
one hand, taste was associated with base and sinful appetites. On the other, 
it was associated with positive and potentially virtuous forms of knowledge 
and discrimination. These positive associations of taste, moreover, frequently 
carried over into writing about the sweetness of sex. Guillaume Du Vair’s 
influential The moral philosophie of the Stoicks (1598) is revealing here. 
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Whilst Du Vair sticks to his neo-Stoic guns in warning against the dangers of 
unlicensed desire, he also celebrates its nuptial value:
Let us […] provide our selves of strong rampires and bulwarkes to warde 
us against this passion […] she baites us with honie, to glut us with gall: 
she setteth before our eyes a vaine shew of pleasure, which passeth away in 
a moment, and leaves us sorrow and griefe which remaineth for ever […] 
Let us altogether abstaine from it (if it be possible) before wee bee married: 
for […] it makes them lose the sweetnesse of marriage which they alone 
doe taste which have not used it before, a sweetnes which souldereth and 
knitteth together the friendship of marriage.25
Sexual desire ‘baites us with honie, to glut us with gall’; here, the sweetness 
of sex is dangerously deceptive. Within the legitimate bounds of marriage, 
however, it also serves an important and valuable role, working to forge 
conjugal harmony and so to consolidate moral virtue.
Sweetness in Othello
The language of erotic sweetness, then, swings both ways: it can either gesture 
towards humankind’s fallenness and irrationality, or it can indicate the 
presence of a discriminative, potentially redemptive form of apprehension and 
affection. The ambivalence is also central to Othello (c. 1603), which dramatizes 
both the tension between taste as brutish, sensual appetite, and taste as a mode 
of judgement, and a conflict between vision and taste as alternative sources 
of knowledge. Early in the play, Cassio offers Desdemona an elegant (albeit 
conventional) compliment. Othello, he says,
hath achieved a maid
That paragons description and wild fame;
One that excels the quirks of blazoning pens[.]
(2.1.61–3)
Cassio implies that Desdemona poses a challenge: if she cannot be depicted, 
she also cannot be known. Indeed, Desdemona’s resistance to apprehension 
is translated, by various characters in the play, as a dubious secrecy. 
Noticing this, Stanley Cavell interprets Othello’s suspicion of his wife as an 
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only to the possibility that he might not possess his wife’s chastity but also 
to the impossibility of ever knowing, for certain, that he does so.26 Other 
scholars have explored the ways in which Desdemona’s body is presented as 
a mystery which might be understood and controlled if it can be accurately 
and comprehensively seen. Patricia Parker, for example, identifies in the play a 
‘network of associations’ between the female genitalia and hidden knowledge, 
which prompts in the jealous Othello an ‘ocular impulse […] a fascination […] 
with exposing what lay hid to the scrutiny of the gaze’.27 This kind of reading 
is characteristic of new historicism’s visual and political preoccupations. The 
language of Othello, however, is not only permeated with visual metaphor; it 
also interweaves desire, sexual jealousy, and taste. Take Act 3, Scene 3, in which 
Othello is transformed from a loving husband to a man wild with suspicion. 
He laments:
I had been happy if the general camp,
Pioneers and all, had tasted her sweet body,
So I had nothing known.
(3.3.348–50)
Othello both draws on taste’s associations with sexual knowledge and – in 
his use of the epithet ‘sweet’ – retains its connection to physical sensation. 
Importantly, Othello’s choice of verb at this critical moment is not an isolated 
example: throughout the play, he consistently links sexual and gustatory 
appetites. Perhaps most obviously, Othello’s epithets for his wife linger on 
her supposed flavour: they include ‘honey’ (2.1.203), ‘sweeting’ (2.3.248), and 
‘sweet’ (3.3.55–6, 5.2.50). And while Othello extensively utilizes the language 
of erotic tasting, Othello offers a covert but sustained reflection on the meaning 
and value of such language, testing its negative (lapsarian) and positive 
(discriminative) associations against each other.
Initially, the play appears to be invested in the narrative associating both 
gustation and eroticism with degenerate, irrational appetite. Othello and 
Iago, of course, occupy very different places in Shakespeare’s Venice. Othello’s 
marriage to Desdemona quickly exposes his social position, as a successful 
and apparently well-respected soldier, as contingent on his exclusion from 
the inner sanctums of Venetian social and familial life, his tacit acceptance 
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of a fundamental, raced ‘otherness’: Desdemona’s recourse to Othello’s ‘sooty 
bosom’, Brabantio accuses, can only be explained by witchcraft (1.2.70). Iago’s 
professional frustrations, on the other hand, grow partly from a sense of 
entitlement (‘I know my price’) which is itself dependent on his identity (in 
contrast to the ‘Florentine’ Cassio) not only as an Italian but as a Venetian 
(1.1.11,  1.1.20). Iago’s sense of his own difference from ‘the Moor’ Othello, 
however, is undermined by their sensory similarities: both Othello and Iago 
frame the association between sweet tastes and sensual pleasures pejoratively.
Early in the play, Othello insists that his support of Desdemona’s request to 
join him in Cyprus is motivated not by ‘the palate of my appetite’ but rather 
by a wish ‘to be free and bounteous to her mind’ (1.3.263–6). Othello uses the 
language of ‘appetite’ to denounce sexual desire as capricious and mindless. 
What are we to make of this? As Mary Floyd-Wilson has pointed out, the 
portrayal of Othello’s ‘passionate jealousy’ not only reflects a broader ‘racial 
stereotype’ regarding the supposed intemperance of ‘Moors’; it also ‘has its prior 
origins in England’s obsession with an Italianate and urban form of dramatic 
jealousy’. For a Jacobean audience, Floyd-Wilson explains, jealousy could be ‘a 
symptom of hypercivility rather than barbarism’ and was sometimes viewed 
as one outcome of a pathological form of ‘neo-Stoic control’: ‘Italians came 
to represent over-disciplined interventionists, whose wilful self-regulation 
produced pathological inwardness rather than temperance.’28 In this context, 
Othello’s dismissal of his ‘appetite’ for his wife seems less like laudable self-
control than symptom of incipient suspicion: it is a sign of his assimilation to a 
particularly Italianate form of refinement that is, nonetheless, never more than 
a hairsbreadth away from extreme violence.
This suggestion is buttressed by the fact that Iago takes a similar tack: 
anticipating the deterioration of Othello and Desdemona’s initial state of 
marital bliss, he reassures the lustful Roderigo that Desdemona’s ‘eye must be 
fed. And what delight shall she have to look on the devil? […] her delicate 
tenderness will find itself abused, begin to heave the gorge, disrelish and 
abhor the moor’ (2.1.223–31). And if Desdemona will, as Iago predicts, come 
to ‘disrelish’ Othello because of his supposedly devilish appearance, Othello 
will be brought to feel distaste for Desdemona by Iago’s own machinations. 
Whilst Othello currently finds his wife ‘luscious as locusts’ (that is, sweet cassia 
pods), the suspicion of her fidelity that Iago himself instils will ensure that 
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she ‘shall be to him shortly as acerb as coloquintida’ (the fruit also known 
as the bitter-apple) (1.3.349–50). Here, Iago positions himself as a corrupter 
of Othello’s natural tastes. Iago exploits and confirms Othello’s initial belief 
that sexual tastes offer a fallen, irrational form of pleasure which should be 
rejected: they correspond, not to the reality of the thing itself (or, rather, the 
woman herself) but to arbitrary, transient, and malleable predilections and 
revulsions. Othello’s jealousy, then, might be understood partly as a result of 
his assimilation – encouraged by Iago – of Italian social and cultural norms: his 
rejection of his ‘sweet’ Desdemona grows partly out of a form of sophistication 
predicated not only on the control, but on the rejection, of natural appetites.
Conversely, a number of characters in the play associate vision with 
epistemological mastery. Most famously, Othello’s demand for ‘ocular proof ’ 
(3.3.363) of his wife’s alleged betrayal exemplifies his wider conflation of 
vision and certain knowledge (this conflation is built, for instance, into his 
assertion that Iago ‘sees and knows more […] than he unfolds’ (3.3.247), where 
the conjunctive ‘and’ suggests a presumed equivalence between seeing and 
knowing). For a number of critics, the disastrous consequences of this desire 
for ‘ocular proof ’ indicate an implicit critique of the new empirical natural 
philosophy.29 Notably, James Knapp argues that ‘Shakespeare presents us with 
an object (the handkerchief) so unstable that it becomes emblematic of the 
flaws endemic to empiricist (materialist) epistemologies.’30 The failure of the 
visual emblem of the handkerchief to materialize the reality of Desdemona’s 
spousal fidelity represents the failure of vision to apprehend the truth of the 
material world.
In the context of the failure of ocular proof, taste – derided by the villainous 
Iago and the misguided Othello as akin to lustful appetite – takes on a new 
value. In particular, taste comes to stand for a form of knowledge which is 
experiential without being, precisely, empirical. In her speech offering a partial 
vindication of female adultery, Emilia points to this possibility. ‘I do think’, 
announces Emilia:
it is their husbands’ faults
If wives do fall. Say that they slack their duties
And pour our treasures into foreign laps;
Or else break out in peevish jealousies,
Throwing restraint upon us; or say they strike us,
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Or scant our former having in despite,
Why, we have galls: and though we have some grace
Yet have we some revenge. Let husbands know
Their wives have sense like them: they see, and smell,
And have their palates both for sweet and sour
As husbands have. What is it that they do
When they change us for others? Is it sport?
I think it is. And doth affection breed it?
I think it doth. Is’t frailty that thus errs?
It is so too. And have not we affections?
Desires for sport? and frailty, as men have?31
(5.1.85–100)
Poised between her initial ascription of women’s infidelity to husbandly abuse, 
and her subsequent suggestion that, like men, women take lovers simply 
as a result of their natural ‘Desires for sport’, Emilia’s declaration that wives 
‘have their palates both for sweet and sour’ is ambiguous. On the one hand, it 
describes female rationality: women have enough sense – in both senses – to 
respond negatively to mistreatment. On the other hand, it describes female 
corruptibility: just as men and women have their senses in common, so too 
do they share a yearning for sensual pleasure. For Iago, the difference between 
the sweetness of cassia pods and coloquintida bitterness is a matter of pure 
affect: of irresistible desire versus sexual disgust. For his wife, however, to 
have a palate ‘both for sweet and sour’ – in other words, to have taste – can 
mean to possess trivial appetitive desires for sexual ‘sport’, but it can also 
indicate possession of reasonable, universally shared, fundamentally rational 
preferences and aversions, guided by judgement as well as by instinct.
Emilia’s speech, then, clears the way for an alternative interpretation of 
Othello’s preoccupation with Desdemona’s sexual sweetness. According 
to Iago’s association of taste with irrational, sinful sexual desire, Othello’s 
honeyed endearments for Desdemona might be understood (despite his own 
protestations to the contrary) to betray Othello’s enthralment to ‘the palate 
of [his] appetite’. On the other hand, they also prefigure Emilia’s ultimate 
vindication of Desdemona as ‘sweet Desdemona […] sweet Mistress’, and ‘the 
sweetest innocent’ (5.2.120,  197). The narrative trajectory of the play thus 
bears out Othello’s perception – disclaim it though he may – that Desdemona 
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is ‘sweet’. Despite its denigration, taste – and the sexual appetites it entwines 
with – proves a surer route to certainty than vision, offering a kind of intuitive 
experiential knowledge that the play opposes to an ocularcentric empiricism. 
Othello indicates – if it does not wholeheartedly endorse – a conception of 
gustatory and erotic tastes as valuable sources of intersubjective and erotic 
knowledge, and of sweetness as a marker of virtue.
De gustibus non est disputandum? Taste and value in 
Troilus and Cressida
In Venus and Adonis, Adonis’s sense of his own unripe sourness is counterparted 
by Venus’s insistence on his lip-smacking sweetness: he is, she tells him, ‘sweet 
above compare’ (8). This points to another aspect of taste: not only was the 
moral status of the sense in contention, so too was the basic nature of specific 
taste sensations. In Shakespeare’s England as today, the Latin adage de gustibus 
non est disputandum (there is no disputing about tastes) was axiomatic.32 The 
sense of taste, this maxim implies, is so idiosyncratic, so personal and arbitrary, 
that there is simply no point in arguing about it. As Brathwaite comments, ‘of 
all others, this Sence produceth the diverst qualities […] this facultie, either 
by an indisposition of the bodie, or a distinct operation in the subject, showes 
this pleasing and acceptable to one, which is noisome and different to an 
other’.33 Precisely because taste is subject to such differences of opinion, one 
should resist contesting it. Despite this, disputes about taste raged amongst 
physicians, writers, and philosophers alike. Should taste be associated primarily 
with brutish and irrational physical appetites, or with mental discrimination 
and judgement? Does the subjectivity of taste make it more or less useful as 
a source of knowledge? Who has the authority to distinguish healthy from 
unwholesome tastes?
According to Renaissance medical theory, discrepancies in taste could be 
explained as a result of a pathological imbalance of the humours: individuals 
with jaundice, for instance, might ‘find Honey to be bitter in taste’ because 
of ‘the great choler and inflammation wherewith their tongue and palate of 
their mouth is infected’.34 In some cases, then, the subjectivity of taste was a 
symptom of sickness. But in the context of humoralism, such subjectivity was 
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also, simply, a basic feature of taste: the perception of flavour was understood 
to be affected by aspects of humoral constitution which were not necessarily 
pathological but simply a result of ordinary variations in physical complexion, 
as well as factors such as age, sex, and circumstance. As Sir Walter Raleigh 
puts it in his posthumously published Skeptick, or speculations (1651), a partial 
translation of the ancient Greek philosopher and physician Sextus Empiricus’s 
Outlines, ‘divers creatures […] having tongues drier, or moister according to 
their several temperatures, when they tast the same thing, must needs conceit 
it to be according as the instrument of their tast is affected, either bitter, or 
sweet’.35 Variations in taste are a result of humoral disposition, as well as 
indisposition.
Because of this inherent subjectivity, the language of taste emerges in 
the Renaissance as indispensable for articulating and exploring the broader 
questions about the nature and reliability of knowledge raised by the sixteenth-
century revival of sceptical philosophy. As Michel de Montaigne writes in ‘An 
Apologie of Raymond Sebond’:
The distasted impute wallowishnesse unto Wine: the healthie, good taste; 
and the thirstie brisknesse, rellish and delicacie. Now our condition 
appropriating things unto it selfe, and transforming them to it’s owne 
humour: we know no more how things are in sooth and truth; For, nothing 
comes unto us but falsified and altered by our senses.36
Here, the subjectivity of taste – which is both pathological and an innate aspect 
of ‘our condition’ – is archetypal of the variability and unreliability of all the 
senses, and hence our inability to know anything at all ‘in sooth and truth’. 
Variations in gustatory perceptions are typical of our broader tendency to 
remake the world in our own image – or more accurately here, according to 
our own tastes.
Shakespeare, of course, was deeply engaged with sceptical thought – and 
nowhere more so than in Troilus and Cressida (c. 1602), a play that, as William 
Hamlin and numerous others have noted, ‘exposes human acts of valuation 
to relentless sceptical scrutiny’.37 In particular, it is concerned with the 
philosophical question of whether value itself should be taken as intrinsic to 
and fixed in specific objects and individuals (a position held by the medieval 
theologian Thomas Aquinas, amongst others), or whether value is extrinsic and 
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unstable, conferred by and in acts of subjective evaluation (a position which 
would later be articulated and developed by the political philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes).38 As scholars including Caroline Spurgeon and David Hillman have 
observed, moreover, the play also draws extensively on culinary and gustatory 
language, often using such language to interrogate the ethical status of sexual 
desire.39 In the eat-or-be-eaten world of Troy and its environs, conventional, 
courtly images of eroticized sweetness are pushed to a cannibalistic extreme: 
women are (as Pandarus and Troilus joke of Cressida in the opening scene) 
consumables, cakes to be ground, kneaded, baked, and eaten (1.1.14–24).40 
Less frequently explored, however, is the interweaving of these two concerns: 
that is, the way the play’s philosophical interrogation of the nature of ‘value’ 
proceeds through sensory images of sexualized tasting and consuming.41
In Troilus and Cressida, the philosophical question of whether value is 
objective and innate, or subjective and contingent, is articulated most pressingly 
in relation to Helen and Cressida’s sexual value.42 Is Helen, for example, valued 
(desired) because she is valuable (desirable), as Troilus implies when he claims 
that she is ‘a pearl / Whose price hath launched above a thousand ships’ 
(2.2.81–2), or is she valuable (desirable) because she is valued (desired), as he 
suggests when he claims that she ‘must needs be fair, / When with your blood 
you daily paint her thus’ (1.1.86–7)? And because erotic desire is repeatedly 
described in terms of alimentary appetite, the question of value is also a 
question of (sexualized) taste. More specifically, I want to suggest, Troilus and 
Cressida proposes that if value is innate, then the subjective character of taste 
will inevitably compromise our ability to accurately perceive and understand 
the world around us – including other people. If, on the other hand, value is 
conferred or accrued in acts of evaluation, then the subjectivity of taste is not 
only a means of apprehending but a way of constituting the value of objects it 
apprehends.
When Priam points out reprovingly although Helen is experienced as ‘honey’ 
by the ‘besotted’ Paris, she is ‘gall’ to his compatriots, who suffer besiegement 
because of her (2.2.143–4), he implies that the subjectivity of taste is aberrant 
and abhorrent. Hector agrees: Paris’s craving for Helen is the ‘hot passion 
of distempered blood’ (2.2.169), a sickness which corrupts his reason and 
prevents him from knowing her as she really is. Similarly, Diomedes’ answer 
to Paris’s question – ‘Who, in your thoughts, merits fair Helen most, / Myself 
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or Menelaus?’ (4.1.55–6) – implies that both parties’ desire for Helen can be 
explained by the pathological corruption of their appetites:
Both alike.
He merits well to have her that doth seek her,
Not making any scruple of her soilure,
With such a hell of pain and world of charge;
And you as well to keep her that defend her,
Not palating the taste of her dishonour[.]
(4.1.56–61)
Helen, asserts Diomedes, is soiled goods, and in not recognizing the true 
‘taste of her dishonour’, Paris and Menelaus reveal the vitiation of their 
senses.43 Paris’s rejoinder, ‘you are too bitter to your countrywoman’, turns the 
accusation back on Diomedes himself, but Diomedes is firm: ‘she’s bitter to 
her county’ (4.1.69–70). According to Priam, Hector, and Diomedes, in their 
fidelity (or enthralment) to Helen, Menelaus and Paris have cut themselves off 
from the consensus of their respective countries and aligned themselves with 
the appetite of their bitterest opponent – each other – in an estrangement that 
is as much sensory as political and social.
At other points in the play, however, the question is not so much who has 
the authority to arbitrate in matters of value or taste – the infatuated Paris or 
the suffering citizens and soldiers – but rather whether that arbitration itself 
has any role in determining value or taste. In other words, the issue is whether 
value is an objective quality of an object or individual, something with an 
independent existence which may or may not be accurately apprehended, or 
whether value is conferred through intersubjective acts of evaluation.44 In the 
case of Helen, the question becomes not whether she is sweet or bitter, honey 
or gall, but whether she is really either of these things all at, or only insofar as 
she is experienced as such. Thus, in the debate about whether to return her to 
the Greeks in order to end the war, Hector urges Troilus to agree: ‘She is not 
worth what she doth cost / The holding’ (2.2.51–2), he reasons. Hector implies 
that Helen’s ‘worth’ (or rather, lack thereof) is independent of her ‘cost’. Troilus, 
however, disagrees: ‘What’s aught but as ’tis valued?’ (2.2.53), he replies. For 
Troilus, desire itself has a role in determining value: it is a form of evaluation 
which confers worth on its object.
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As the debate proceeds, however, the lines between Hector’s and Troilus’s 
positions become blurred. Thus, whilst Hector’s reply seems firmly to refute 
Troilus’s constructivism, it is in fact somewhat ambiguous: ‘But value’, he 
admonishes Troilus:
dwells not in particular will;
It holds his estimate and dignity
As well wherein ’tis precious of itself
As in the prizer.
(2.2.53–6)
Hector’s assertion that ‘value dwells not in particular will’ seems unequivocal 
enough, and indeed commentators on this passage have tended to take it 
(ironically enough) at face value.45 Hector’s position, however, is closer to 
Troilus’s than it initially appears: by asserting that value derives ‘as well wherein 
’tis precious of itself / As in the prizer’ (my emphasis), he frames intrinsic value as 
supplementary to that conferred by ‘the prizer’. As such, he concedes that value is 
(at least partially) created, rather than simply recognized, in acts of valuation.46
Conversely, Troilus’s epistemological relativism is paired with a kind of 
moral absolutism, which he turns to the terms of taste to articulate. ‘How 
may I avoid’, he asks Hector, ‘Although my will distaste what it elected, / The 
wife I chose? […] [T]he remainder viands / We do not throw in unrespective 
sieve / Because we are now full’ (2.2.65–72). Here, Troilus uses the language 
of taste to anticipate and pre-emptively answer the obvious ethical objection 
to his insistence that ‘value’ resides partly in ‘the prizer’: namely that if this 
is indeed the case, such value is impossibly unstable, for (as we saw in Venus 
and Adonis and The Rape of Lucrece) the sweetness of desire has a tendency 
to segue, once it is satisfied, into disgust and distaste. For Troilus, the fact that 
Helen was once perceived to be ‘worth keeping’ (2.2.82) entails an ethical and 
social commitment: just as we do not thoughtlessly throw away food once 
we are replete, we ought not discard a woman because our appetite for her is 
sated.47 Taste itself may be radically subjective, but eating practices teach us 
that this epistemological uncertainly does not necessarily engender a state of 
moral nihilism. Like Othello, therefore, Troilus and Cressida interrogates both 
the epistemological and the ethical status of taste – especially a specifically 
sexualized experience of sweetness.
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Indeed, in Troilus and Cressida, the sense of taste is repeatedly linked to a 
form of certainty which emerges through, not in spite of, subjective differences 
of opinion. We can see this, for instance, in the way that the play uses the 
language of tasting and consuming in order to compare and contrast erotic 
love and what Priam calls the ‘hot digestion of this cormorant war’ (2.2.6) 
as allied, though ultimately distinct, testing grounds of masculine virtue. The 
association between love and war is, of course, conventional enough – but it 
gains sensuous force and ethical and epistemic specificity in the context of the 
play’s alimentary obsessions. Take Troilus’s reply to Cressida’s teasing assertion 
that ‘all lovers swear more performance than they are able’ (3.2.81–2): drawing 
on taste’s epistemic associations with experiential trial and testing, he asks her 
to ‘praise us as we are tasted, allow us as we prove’ (3.2.87–8).48 Troilus’s words 
are playful, but they also echo both Nestor’s description of the anticipated 
contest between Hector and Achilles as a ‘trial’ in which the Trojans will ‘taste 
our dear’st repute / With their finest palate’ (1.3.338–9), and Agamemnon’s 
subsequent warning that if he refuses to fight, Achilles’ ‘virtues’ are ‘like fair 
fruit in an unwholesome dish […] like to rot untasted’ (2.3.115–19). On 
one level, the echo implies that Troilus’s boasting is a transparent attempt to 
frame effeminate sensuality as martial heroism; as such, it ironically marks 
their incompatibility. On another, however, ‘taste’ serves in both the martial 
and the erotic realms to indicate a form of certainty that is forged precisely 
in an adversarial clash of perspectives, as differences of opinion are translated 
into the terms of physical contact. Both martial combat and seduction, 
such language implies, are scenes of self-testing, as well as of intersubjective 
antagonism: love and war alike are forums for the tasting/testing of a certain 
kind of male subjectivity that emerges when it is contested. Just as Achilles’ 
virtues will rot and decay if they are not tested in combat, Troilus’s true nature 
can only emerge in the lists of love.
Troilus and Cressida never quite resolves the questions it raises about the 
role of personal opinion in evaluating and determining value.49 But it does 
suggest that – here and elsewhere in Shakespeare’s works – the language of 
taste is an invaluable resource for probing this question, offering a vocabulary 
which combines the forceful, persuasive immediacy of physical experience 
and intense affective response with radical uncertainty, ephemerality, and 
unreliability. At the end of the play, Pandarus sings, ‘sweet honey and sweet 
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notes together fail’: Shakespeare’s dramatic interrogation of the nature of 
intersubjective knowledge and the morality of desire is inextricable from his 
poetics of taste.
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reads the play’s food metaphors as evidence of its links with the Inns of Court, 
and as a way of managing audience expectations in ‘Shakespeare’s “sugred 
Sonnets”, Troilus and Cressida and the Odcomian Banquet: An Exploration of 
Promising Paratexts, Expectations and Matters of Taste’, Shakespeare 6, no. 2 
(2010): 198–203.
40 Troilus, too, is ‘minced’ and ‘baked’ in Cressida’s lexicon (1.2.247): this is 
equal-opportunity eroticized cannibalism.
41 One exception is C. C. Barfoot, ‘Troilus and Cressida: “Praise us as we are tasted”’, 
Shakespeare Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1988): 45–57. Barfoot traces how the play’s 
language of tasting/testing intersects with its interest in praising, prizing, and 
pricing.
42 As Harris notes, the women in the play are ‘coded as public yardsticks of value’ 
(‘Pathologies of Value’, 13).
43 Diomedes’s fastidious moralism at this point is, of course, rendered ironic in the 
context of his later entanglement with Cressida.
Disputing about Taste 109
44 This is part of what is at stake in 3.3, when Achilles interrupts Ulysses reading 
an unidentified book which, Ulysses informs him, argues that ‘man […] Cannot 
make boast to have that which he hath, / Nor feels not what he owes, but by 
reflection’ (3.3.91–3).
45 Harris, for instance, hears Hector’s pronouncement as a normative assertion that 
‘any object’s value ought to be “precious of itself ”’ (‘Pathologies of Value’, 13).
46 Recognizing this makes Hector’s ultimate volte-face in this scene, as he resolves 
to keep Helen on the basis of ‘our joint and several dignities’ (2.2.193) less 
surprising than it is often taken to be (Frank Kermode, for instance, calls it 
‘unconvincing’ in ‘Opinion in Troilus and Cressida’, Critical Quarterly 54, no. 1 
(2012): 93).
47 On the connections between eating and ethics in Renaissance literature and 
culture more broadly, see David B. Goldstein, Eating and Ethics in Shakespeare’s 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
48 On the relations between tasting and testing in this passage, see Barfoot, ‘“Praise 
us as we are tasted”’, 53–4.
49 As Harris observes, ‘even as the play disqualifies the possibility of fixed and 
intrinsic worth, it […] also literally pathologizes attributive value’ (‘Pathologies 
of Value’, 17).
